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ABSTRACT: The UK’s decision to leave the EU poses a particular challenge for Scotland where 62 per 
cent of the population voted in favour of remaining. This has led to calls – amongst others by the 
Scottish Government – that Scotland should be allowed to either stay in the EU or at the very least 
in the EU's single market. In a first step this On the Agenda provides an analysis in how far a differ-
entiated solution for Scotland as part of the UK would be legally possible and whether it would be 
practicable; in a second step the On the Agenda discusses the legal conditions under which an in-
dependent Scotland would be able to either join the EU or stay in the single market. 
 
KEYWORDS: Brexit – Scotland – differentiated integration – secession – European Economic Area – 
European Free Trade Association. 
 
I. Introduction 
For lawyers and political scientists alike, the United Kingdom’s (UK) decision to leave the 
EU following the referendum held on 23 June 2016 is probably the most exciting drama 
to be observed and commented on in a generation. While the main focus is under-
standably on the intricacies of the divorce settlement and the exact ramifications of any 
future relations between the EU and the UK, these questions are somewhat more com-
plex from a Scottish viewpoint. 
 
* Senior Lecturer in EU Law, Edinburgh Law School, tobias.lock@ed.ac.uk. 
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The main reason is that while the whole of the UK voted to leave the EU by a margin 
of 51.9 to 48.1 per cent, the Scottish electorate voted to remain in the EU by a margin of 
62 to 38 per cent with not a single electoral area backing “leave”. This led Scotland’s First 
Minister Nicola Sturgeon to announce immediately after the referendum that she 
wished “to take all possible steps and explore all options to […] to secure our continuing 
place in the EU and in the single market in particular”.1 
The aim of this contribution is to explore how, legally speaking, such a continuing 
place can be secured. The discussion will reveal that European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA) and EEA membership for Scotland within the UK would be a theoretical possibil-
ity, but would require far-reaching adjustments to Scotland’s constitutional position in 
the UK compared with current devolution settlements. The alternative would be Scot-
tish independence, which would resolve these internal constitutional difficulties, but 
would nonetheless pose challenges for future relations between an independent Scot-
land either in the EU or EFTA/EEA and the rest of the UK. 
II. Background: Scotland’s place in the UK 
Scotland is an integral part of the UK.2 It has had its own parliament and government 
since 1999,3 to which powers have been devolved from the central UK Parliament and 
Government at Westminster. The powers are extensive and include much of the civil 
and criminal law applicable in Scotland, environmental law, health, housing, agriculture, 
fisheries, policing, some taxation, education, to name the most important ones.4 The 
UK’s devolution arrangement differs from federalism in two key respects: first, not all 
parts of the UK have devolved powers. England – by far the biggest part of the UK in 
terms of population and landmass – is governed largely from Westminster.5 Second, the 
Westminster Parliament retains powers to legislate on devolved matters, although by 
convention it will normally only do so if the Scottish Parliament agrees.6 
 
1 For the full speech, see Stv, Nicola Sturgeon speech in full after EU referendum result, in Stv News, 
24 June 2016, stv.tv. 
2 The Union between Scotland and England was sealed in the Act of Union, entered into force on the 
1st May 1707. 
3 Prior to that Scotland was governed centrally from Westminster. 
4 The model adopted in Scotland (but not in Wales, for instance) is one of “reserved powers”, i.e. the 
Scottish parliament can legislate on everything, unless it has been expressly reserved for Westminster. The 
reserved powers are listed in Schedule 5 of the Scotland Act 1998, passed by the UK Parliament. 
5 The London mayor has certain executive powers, however, as do the new “metro mayors” elected in 
seven English city regions in May 2017. Legislative powers remains with the Westminster Parliament, however. 
6 This is the so-called Sewel Convention, which is now (partly) laid down in section 28, para. 8, of the 
Scotland Act 1998.  
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There is a strong independence movement in Scotland and the pro-independence 
Scottish National Party has governed Scotland since 2007.7 Following a political agree-
ment with the Westminster Government in 2012,8 the Scottish Parliament legislated for 
an independence referendum to be held in 2014. In that referendum the voters reject-
ed independence by 55.3 to 44.7 per cent. 
From the perspective of the Scottish electorate the question arises whether the cir-
cle of reconciling their wishes expressed in two referendums that have taken place over 
less than two years can be squared. In other words, would it be legally possible for Scot-
land to stay both in the UK and in the EU – or at least in the single market and certain 
other EU policies – considering the UK’s desire to leave the EU? 
If this proves unattainable, either legally or politically, would a vote for Scottish in-
dependence result in immediate EU membership under the same terms currently en-
joyed or would there be additional hurdles? Moreover, what would EU membership of 
an independent Scotland mean for relations with the rest of the UK, which would after 
all be its biggest trading partner? 
The election manifesto of the Scottish National Party promised that there should be 
another independence referendum “if there is a significant and material change in the cir-
cumstances that prevailed in 2014, such as Scotland being taken out of the EU against our 
will”.9 The Scottish government has interpreted the result of the Brexit referendum to 
mean exactly that. Indeed, the Scottish Parliament has asked the Scottish Government to 
initiate a process whereby Westminster would grant permission for another referendum 
to go ahead even though this has fallen on deaf ears in Westminster so far. 
There are thus three basic scenarios for Scotland after Brexit: the first is to leave the 
EU together with the “rest of the UK” (hereinafter, rUK) and under the same conditions. 
This would probably mean that Scotland (with the rUK) would be outside the single mar-
ket and the EU customs union. There would be no free movement of people and trade 
would happen on the basis of a free trade deal. In addition, the UK might cooperate with 
the EU in certain policy areas, such as security, justice, and research. This would probably 
happen on a bilateral basis with the EU (where it has competence) or on a bilateral basis 
with individual Member States where these are free to conclude international agreements 
under EU law.10 This scenario does not warrant further discussion in this paper. 
The second scenario would see the rUK leave the EU, but Scotland would either stay 
in the EU or at least in the single market and would be able to cooperate with the EU 
 
7 Initially as a minority government (2007-2011), then as a majority government (2011-2016) and 
again as a minority government (since 2016). 
8 The so-called Edinburgh Agreement, concluded on 12 October 2012. It can be read at www.gov.scot. 
9 Scottish National Party, Manifesto, 2016, p. 23.  
10 This broadly reflects Prime Minister Theresa May’s Lancaster House speech, in which she set out 
the UK’s negotiating objectives for leaving the EU. See T. MAY, The government’s negotiating objectives for 
exiting the EU, in Gov.Uk, 17 January 2017, www.gov.uk. 
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separately in other fields. As will be shown, this scenario is legally complex and political-
ly highly ambitious. 
Finally, the third scenario would see Scotland leave the UK and either become an EU 
Member State in its own right or, if that is either not feasible or desirable, become a 
member of the EFTA and the EEA and be part of the single market as an independent 
country. 
The latter two scenarios will be addressed in turn. It will become evident that there 
is no silver bullet for Scotland. Each scenario brings with it advantages and drawbacks. 
III. Scotland as part of the UK: the legal options around a special 
deal 
iii.1. EU membership for Scotland as part of the UK? 
Arguably, the will of the Scottish electorate – as expressed in the two recent referendums 
– would be best reflected if Scotland were able to stay part of the UK and in the EU. 
No Member State has ever left the EU, so that the Scottish situation is unprece-
dented. There is no provision in the EU Treaties allowing a part of a Member State to 
remain in the EU while the rest of the Member State leaves. Nor is there a general pro-
vision allowing for regionally differentiated integration of existing Member States. 
At the same time, the EU Treaties provide plenty of evidence that there is flexibility 
to accommodate unusual constitutional situations. There are many individually negoti-
ated examples of territorial differentiation in the EU.11 Examples include Cyprus, where 
the EU’s acquis is suspended in the northern part of the island given that the Cypriot 
government does not exercise effective control there;12 as well as Gibraltar which is 
outside the customs union, but within the EU.13 
A possible solution mooted for Scotland in the immediate aftermath of the EU ref-
erendum was the so-called “reverse Greenland” option.14 Greenland became part of the 
European Communities with Danish accession in 1973, but left in 1985 after a referen-
 
11 N. SKOUTARIS, From Britain and Ireland to Cyprus: Accommodating ‘Divided Islands’ in the EU 
Political and Legal Order, in EUI Working Papers, 2016/02, pp. 6-9. 
12 See Protocol no. 10 on Cyprus of the Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Czech Re-
public, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, 
the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the 
Slovak Republic and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is founded; see also N. 
SKOUTARIS, From Britain and Ireland to Cyprus, cit., pp. 9-11. 
13 See Art. 28 of the Act concerning the Conditions of Accession and the Adjustments to the Treaties, 
Annexed to the Treaty concerning the accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, the Kingdom of 
Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the European Economic Com-
munity and to the European Atomic Energy Community. 
14 See e.g. A. RAMSEY, A reverse Greenland: the EU should let Scotland stay, in openDemocracyUK, 24 
June 2016, www.opendemocracy.net. 
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dum whilst remaining part of Denmark. In technical legal terms, this was effected by 
way of Treaty change. The Treaty amending, with regard to Greenland, the Treaties es-
tablishing the European Communities (Greenland Treaty) added Greenland to the over-
seas territories of the Member States in what is now Annex II (“Overseas Countries and 
Territories to which the Provisions of Part Four of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union Apply”) to the founding Treaties. As a consequence Greenland was no 
longer part of the EU, but became a territory “associated” with the EU.15 Association 
primarily serves the end of furthering “the interests and prosperity of the inhabitants of 
these countries and territories in order to lead them to the economic, social and cultur-
al development to which they aspire”.16 
A “reverse Greenland” model for the UK would mean that the UK would formally 
remain a Member State, but that the EU Treaties would no longer apply to England and 
Wales (which voted to leave), but only to Scotland and possibly Northern Ireland.17 The 
EU Treaties would thus need to be amended to not apply to England and Wales. In 
technical terms this would require Treaty change according to Art. 48 TEU, but given 
that the EU Treaties would need to be amended anyway to reflect “Brexit”, this should 
not present too high a hurdle.18  
Apart from being politically toxic in that it would mean that formally the UK would 
still be in the EU, the legal consequences of pursuing a “reverse Greenland” for the UK 
would be significant. 
First, unless rUK remained in the EU’s customs union, it would result in an internal 
customs border within the UK. Second, with rUK outside the single market, regulatory di-
vergences would occur over time and might result in non-tariff barriers to trade in goods 
and services. A related issue concerns trade in agricultural products. If Scotland continued 
to be covered by the Common Agricultural Policy, but rUK could set its own levels of sub-
sidy, this would in all likelihood result in different market conditions (and therefore prices) 
over time. Under what conditions would rUK be willing to allow Scottish produce on the 
market? Trade between Scotland and rUK would happen under the same conditions as 
trade between rUK and the rest of the EU. Scotland would not be in a position to agree a 
special trade deal with rUK as the power to do so rests exclusively with the EU.19 
 
15 See Art. 198 TFEU. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Northern Ireland also voted to remain with a vote share of 55 per cent; the situation there is even 
more difficult given that it is the only part of the UK sharing a land border with another EU Member State 
(Ireland). For a discussion see B. DOHERTY, J. TEMPLE LANG, C. MCCRUDDEN, L. MCGOWAN, D. PHINNEMORE, D. 
SCHIEK, Northern Ireland and Brexit: the European Economic Area option, in European Policy Centre, 7 
April 2017, www.epc.eu.  
18 See A. ŁAZOWSKI, Withdrawal from the European Union and alternatives to membership, in 
European Law Review, 2012, p. 529. 
19 See Art. 207 TFEU. 
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Third, rUK would probably want to end free movement of people, which Scotland 
would still need to accept. While this would not necessarily mean immigration controls 
at the border,20 it would pose challenges. For one, EU nationals legally resident in Scot-
land would not be able to reside in the rUK, at least until they have obtained either 
permanent residency with effect for the whole of the UK or UK citizenship. In addition, 
Scottish companies employing EU nationals would either not be able to send these em-
ployees to rUK to perform work or there would need to be a special arrangement for 
these purposes. Furthermore, UK citizenship would no longer automatically lead to EU 
citizenship, but only for “Scots”. The difficulty of defining who would be Scottish and 
who would not, could be based on either a residency requirement or a (harder to fulfil) 
domicile requirement. Either way, it would lead to two classes of UK citizens.  
Moreover, a reverse Greenland model would raise complex questions regarding 
Scottish devolution. Much EU secondary law is currently implemented by Westminster. 
This includes consumer law, product standards, employment law, indirect taxation etc. 
It would therefore become necessary for Westminster to devolve these powers to Scot-
land.21 But even if this happens, the consequences of EU law can be rather unpredicta-
ble. The UK would still need to accept the primacy of EU law in cases of conflict between 
a Westminster Act of Parliament and EU law as far as its application in Scotland is con-
cerned. 
Finally, a reverse Greenland model is difficult to square with the EU’s Common For-
eign and Security Policy (CFSP). Even if Scotland were to be given fully autonomous sta-
tus within the UK, the UK would still remain responsible for its defence and for its secu-
rity.22 Just how Scotland would be able to participate in the CFSP without the UK as a 
whole taking part in it or aligning its own policies with it, is not clear. 
This shows that apart from its political unattractiveness for those supporting the 
“leave” vote of June 2016, the reverse Greenland model (or any other model attempting 
to keep Scotland in the EU) would result in the erection of enormous hurdles to intra-
UK relations and would make it impossible for Scotland to participate in the CFSP. 
It cannot therefore be considered a valid option for Scotland. 
iii.2. Scotland in the single market as part of the UK? 
It can be assumed that the difficulties associated with a “reverse Greenland” solution 
prompted the Scottish Government not to pursue this option in its paper “Scotland’s 
Place in Europe” published just before Christmas 2016.23 In this paper the Scottish Gov-
 
20 For details see below, section III.2, let. c). 
21 Alternatively, Westminster could continue legislating in these fields with effect for Scotland only. 
22 Otherwise, Scotland would have to be considered independent, see the criteria for statehood in 
the 1937 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States. 
23 Scottish Government, Scotland's Place in Europe, 20 December 2016, www.gov.scot.  
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ernment sets out various options to ensure that Scotland stays in the single market, 
which it defines as being in “Scotland’s national interest”. The focus of the paper is on 
outlining a differentiated solution for Scotland short of Scottish independence, which 
would see Scotland remaining a member of the EEA with the rUK quitting the EEA.24 
As will be shown, this solution avoids some of the pitfalls of the “reverse Greenland” 
model mentioned above, but would require constitutional engineering both at the Eu-
ropean as well as at the UK level.  
iii.2.a. Joining EFTA and the EEA 
Before Brexit, Scotland finds itself within the EEA on the basis of the UK’s EU member-
ship. With Brexit, the UK will also leave the EEA, unless it decides to re-join EFTA and 
stay in the single market. This option has, however, been ruled out by the Prime Minis-
ter. There is some discussion as to whether the UK would need to give separate notice 
under Art. 27 of the EEA Agreement25 to quit the EEA or whether this is implied in the 
withdrawal notification made under Art. 50 TEU.26 For the present discussion this does 
not matter much. 
Given that EEA membership is predicated on a country either being an EU Member 
State – in which case it is mandatory – or an EFTA Member State, Scotland would need 
to join EFTA first.27 EFTA is open to “any State” acceding to it, provided that the EFTA 
Council approves of accession.28 State in this context means an independent state, so 
that Scotland – if it stayed part of the UK – would currently not be able to join. Hence 
the EFTA Convention would need to be amended in order to allow sub-state entities to 
join.29 The same would be true for the EEA Agreement, which equally allows only 
“States” to join.30 Both treaties can be amended unanimously by all their parties. Given 
that all parties need to approve a new member joining, the necessary amendment 
could be agreed in the treaty allowing Scotland to join itself, so that no sequencing – 
first opening up the two treaties to sub-state entities, then negotiating Scottish acces-
sion – would be legally necessary. 
 
24 Ibid., para. 119. 
25 1993 Agreement on the European Economic Area, entered into force on 1 January 1994. 
26 The argument that a separate notification of withdrawal was necessary was the basis of a court 
case brought against the UK Government arguing that such withdrawal could only be made with the ap-
proval of Parliament. This case was not heard by the High Court because it considered it premature. See 
O. BOWCOTT, Fresh Brexit legal challenge blocked by high court, in The Guardian, 3 February 2017, 
www.theguardian.com. 
27 See Art. 128, para. 1, of the EEA Agreement. 
28 See Art. 56 of the EFTA Convention. 
29 According to the Scottish Government’s paper, the Faroe Islands have asked Denmark to support 
its application to join EFTA. See Scottish Government, Scotland's Place in Europe, cit., para. 108. 
30 See Art. 128 of the EEA Agreement. 
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The far greater act of constitutional engineering, however, would need to happen at 
the UK level. Just like the “reverse Greenland” option, Scottish EFTA/EEA membership 
would require the devolution of additional powers to Scotland in order to enable Scot-
land to comply with EEA rules, which may not be considered a desirable step from a 
Westminster perspective. 
At the same time, the EFTA/EEA solution would remove a number of the legal obsta-
cles inherent in the “reverse Greenland” option. First, Scotland would not be obliged to 
take part in the CFSP. Second, Scotland would not need to be part of the EU’s customs un-
ion and would therefore seem to be free to remain in a customs union with rUK. 
iii.2.b. Trade in goods and services 
However, Art. 56, para. 3, of the EFTA Convention requires a new member of EFTA to 
“apply to become a party to the free trade agreements between the Member States on 
the one hand and third states, unions of states or international organisations on the 
other”. This is, of course, not comparable to the duty to sign up to the EU’s acquis – in-
cluding EU trade agreements – upon accession given that first, EFTA itself does not con-
clude these agreements, but the EFTA Member States. This means that EFTA Member 
States – once they are members – are free not to join an EFTA trade deal. Second, be-
cause EFTA does not entail a customs union there is no logical need for EFTA Member 
States to apply the same tariffs to third countries. Third, the requirement in Art. 56, pa-
ra. 3, of the EFTA Convention would therefore seem to allow for flexibility – either ex-
press or implied – that Scotland would not sign up to those trade agreements with third 
countries that would be incompatible with its customs relationship with rUK. Hence 
there might be political wriggle-room for Scotland in this regard even though a strict le-
gal reading, of course, would mean that the EFTA/EEA model advanced by the Scottish 
Government is not feasible. 
Assuming that Scotland manages to win the approval of EFTA/EEA States and of the 
UK to pursue this option, would this result in frictionless trade in goods and services be-
tween Scotland and the rUK on the one side and Scotland and the EU 27 Member States 
on the other? 
As far as tariffs are concerned, the solution of staying in a customs union with the 
UK will indeed mean no disruption at the Scottish-rUK border. Non-tariff barriers, how-
ever, may present a problem. With the rUK and Scotland probably being subject to dif-
ferent regulatory regimes, differences in standards are likely to develop over time. Scot-
land would remain subject to EU rules and regulations, whereas the rUK would be able 
to set its own standards influenced both by its trading relationships with third countries 
as well as by a desire to cut red tape – short for lowering standards – which after all was 
a key argument in the EU referendum debate. 
For instance, vacuum cleaners traded within the single market must comply with EU 
environmental standards and not use more than 1600W of energy. Imagine rUK chang-
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es its product rules in this regard and allows more powerful vacuum cleaners to be sold 
there. If an English producer of vacuum cleaners wanted to sell its vacuums into the EU, 
it would have to comply with the 1600W limit, but it could produce a more powerful 
product for the UK market. But what if it wanted to sell its vacuum cleaner to Scotland? 
Given that Scotland would be applying EU standards, there is a potential problem of the 
EEA/EFTA solution leading to a disruption of the UK’s internal market: while goods could 
be traded tariff-free they could in practice not flow freely because of diverging product 
standards. The same would be true for services. 
The Scottish Government’s paper seems to have discovered a solution for this, how-
ever.31 The principle of “parallel marketability” (parallele Verkehrsfähigkeit) is currently in 
place for trade between Switzerland and Liechtenstein. Liechtenstein is in a customs un-
ion with Switzerland and also in the EEA, whereas Switzerland is not in the EEA. The prin-
ciple of parallel marketability allows products to freely circulate in Liechtenstein fulfilling 
either the EEA or Swiss product requirements.32 Crucially, however, it restricts access of 
products to other EEA countries marketed under diverging Swiss product requirements 
and vice versa. Compliance with it is monitored the Liechtenstein customs authority. It is 
the responsibility of Liechtenstein to ensure that no goods cross the open border into 
Switzerland that would not be compliant with Swiss product rules.33 
If adopted for Scotland, this would mean that the English high-powered vacuum 
cleaner could be sold in Scotland. But traders would not be able to circumvent the rules 
of the Single Market by importing sub-standard products from England and then selling 
them on to the single market. Just like in the Swiss/Liechtenstein example, this would 
require some form of surveillance. Scottish exporters to the EU would need to make 
sure that their products meet EU product standards, in particular if the products origi-
nate in England. In addition, the same might apply to exports to the rUK. In case the en-
visaged EU-rUK free trade agreement makes diverging product standards possible, the 
rUK might require Scotland to ensure that products from the EU not meeting rUK-
standards are not traded into rUK. This of course would require some paperwork to be 
filled in and seamless trade – as it exists currently – would not be achievable. 
iii.2.c. Free movement of people and immigration. 
A further question is how the EFTA/EEA model for Scotland would affect the UK gov-
ernment’s ambition to end free movement of people from the EU. 
 
31 Scottish Government, Scotland’s Place in Europe, cit., para. 152. 
32 J. PELKMANS, P. BÖHLER, The EEA Review and Liechtenstein’s Integration Strategy, Bruxelles: Centre 
for European Policy Studies (CEPS), 2013, www.ceps.eu, p. 21; see the Law of Liechtenstein of 22 March 
1995 on the Transportability of Goods, published in the Liechtenstein Law Gazette No 94 of 1995.  
33 The law quoted in the previous foonote gives far-reaching powers of inspection to the Liechtenstein 
authorities (see Art. 7 of the Law of Liechtenstein of 22 March 1995 on the Transportability of Goods). 
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As far as EU migration into Scotland is concerned, the solution would not require 
the establishment of a hard border between Scotland and England. Free movement of 
people to Scotland only would mean that EU citizens could work and reside in Scotland, 
but not anywhere else in the UK. It is possible to put checks in place – which is already 
UK practice through employers and landlords for instance – to ensure compliance.34 
An EU citizen who took up employment and residence in England regardless, would 
do so illegally. But the prevention of this eventuality does not require immigration 
checks at the Scottish-rUK border provided that – as is likely – EU citizens will continue 
to be able to visit the UK visa-free.35 If they do so regardless, they act illegally, and there 
are sanctions and enforcement mechanisms in place to prevent this.36 
As outlined in the discussion of the “reverse Greenland” solution, the EFTA/EEA so-
lution would equally require UK citizens to be divided into those who still have free 
movement rights – i.e. those passing as “Scots” – and those who will no longer be able 
to avail of these rights. The Scottish Government’s paper mentions the criterion of 
“domicile”, which is a more permanent status than residency. “Domicile” is a concept 
found in private international law (or conflict of laws). It goes further than mere resi-
dence, i.e. the place where someone currently lives, in that it denotes a person’s per-
manent home. This is a question that necessitates an at times complex legal assess-
ment given that a person acquires their domicile through their father if the parents are 
married; otherwise through their mother. Choosing a new domicile is not easy as it re-
quires a person not only to take up residence in a country, but also to have the inten-
tion of making it their permanent home.37 
The domicile solution would therefore certainly avoid abuse where, for instance, a 
Welshman moves to Edinburgh for a few months in order to qualify as an EEA national 
(i.e. a Scot) and then be allowed to move on to the EU. However, there would be the 
problem that a person loses their domicile of choice if, having acquired it, they then de-
cide to live somewhere else. Hence those people whose domicile of choice is Scotland 
would lose that status once they left Scotland in exercise of their free movement 
rights.38 Hence reliance on domicile as understood by the common law would lead to 
potentially absurd results and would thus need to be replaced or at least supplemented 
by detailed legislation. 
 
34 N. MILLER WESTOBY, J. SHAW, Free Movement, Immigration and Political Rights, 2016, sul-
ne.files.wordpress.com, p. 11. 
35 As can citizens of many non-EU countries, such as the US, Canada, Australia, etc. 
36 The scenario is no different in this regard to “reverse Greenland”. 
37 On domicile under the common law see J.G. COLLIER, Conflict of Laws, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001, p. 37 et seq. 
38 Ibid., pp. 46-47. 
Scotland’s Place in Europe after Brexit: Between a Rock and a Hard Place? 193 
The distinction between being domiciled and being resident can, however, be a 
tricky one to draw, so that if this were adopted we might be seeing much litigation from 
Scots living in England temporarily, but claiming to be still domiciled in Scotland. 
iii.2.d. The effects of EFTA/EEA law in the legal order of Scotland 
Finally, the question arises as to how EFTA/EEA law would affect the Scottish legal order, 
in particular how dispute settlement would be affected. While there is no dispute set-
tlement mechanism for EFTA itself, the (somewhat misnamed) EFTA court decides on 
the interpretation of the EEA Agreement. An important difference between the EEA 
Agreement and the EU Treaties, however, is that the EEA Agreement lacks many of the 
supranational features of EU law: there is no direct effect nor does the EEA Agreement 
require primacy.39 It merely requires compliance. In addition, the decisions of the EFTA 
court in preliminary reference procedures are advisory only.40 
Hence the EEA/EFTA solution would potentially be less intrusive than the “reverse 
Greenland” scenario. Given that it would require devolution on a large scale from 
Westminster to Scotland, there would probably not be too many conflicts between Acts 
of the Westminster Parliament and EEA law, but this cannot be excluded. The lack of di-
rect effect and primacy, however, would make a solution of these conflicts less hierar-
chical and would in any event only require changes with effect for Scotland. It might 
thus be more palatable to those who wish to ensure that UK law is interpreted and ap-
plied by domestic judges only. 
iii.2.e. Conclusion 
The EFTA/EEA solution would therefore seem to pose fewer practical and legal prob-
lems than the “reverse Greenland” scenario. Nonetheless, it would be very difficult to 
achieve in practice given the constitutional obstacles both on the EFTA/EEA side and in 
particular on the UK side. Moreover, the solution was recently rejected by the UK Gov-
ernment, which mainly pointed to the erection of new barriers to trade within the UK as 
a consequence.41 
IV. Scotland as an independent country 
The alternative would be for Scotland to opt for independence and either apply to be-
come an EU Member State or an EFTA/EEA Member State in its own right. It is axiomatic 
 
39 See e.g. T.-I. HARBO, The European Economic Area Agreement: A Case of Legal Pluralism, in Nordic 
Journal of International Law, 2009, p. 201. 
40 Of course this does not detract from the fact that they are highly persuasive. 
41 See letter by D. Davis, the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, addressed to M. Rus-
sel, the Minister for UK Negotiations on Scotland’s Place in Europe of the Scottish Government, 29 March 
2017, www.parliament.scot. 
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that in this scenario there would be no need to adapt the accession criteria of either or-
ganisation or to resolve complex devolution issues. However, there are a number of le-
gal obstacles on the path to independence, which will be explored here before briefly 
addressing the merits of the options an independent Scotland would have with regard 
to European integration.  
iv.1. The path to an independence referendum 
As a first step, Scotland would need to become independent. The 2014 precedent 
means that the only politically conceivable step would be to hold another referendum 
asking Scottish voters whether Scotland should become an independent country. 
UK constitutional law is not entirely clear as to whether the Scottish Parliament can 
unilaterally call another independence vote or whether it needs the prior approval from 
the Westminster Government. According to section 29, para. 1, of the Scotland Act 
1998, an “Act of the Scottish Parliament is not law so far as any provision of the Act is 
outside the legislative competence of the Parliament”. And in section 29, para. 2, let. b), 
it says that an Act falls outside that competence if “it relates to reserved matters”. Re-
served matters are defined in Schedule 5 of the Scotland Act 1998 whose section 1, let. 
b), includes the “Union of the Kingdoms of Scotland” in that category. For some com-
mentators, it follows from this that an Act providing for a referendum aimed at the 
break-up of that very Union relates to a reserved matter and is therefore outside the 
competence of the Scottish Parliament. 
This means for some42 that the only constitutional way of holding another inde-
pendence referendum would be to follow the 2014 precedent where use was made of 
section 30 of the Scotland Act 1998, which allows the Westminster Government to make 
an “Order in Council” – a form of delegated legislation – to modify Schedule 5 and allow 
for a referendum to go ahead.43 
Others, however, argue that this would not be the case if the referendum legislation 
made it clear that the referendum would be advisory only. It would thus constitute a mere 
mandate for the Scottish Government to negotiate independence with Westminster.44  
 
42 See e.g. A. TOMKINS, The Scottish Parliament and the Independence Referendum, in UK Constitu-
tional Law Association – Blog, 12 January 2012, ukconstitutionallaw.org. 
43 The 2013 Order was passed following the approval of both Houses of Parliament and the Scottish 
Parliament. See The Scotland Act 1998 (Modification of Schedule 5) Order 2013. It was time-limited in that 
the referendum had to be held before 31 December 2014. 
44 See G. ANDERSON, C. BELL, S. CRAIG, A. MCHARG, T. MULLEN, S. TIERNEY, N. WALKER, The Independence 
Referendum, Legality and the Contested Constitution: Widening the Debate, in UK Constitutional Law As-
sociation – Blog, 31 January 2012, ukconstitutionallaw.org; N. BARBER, Scottish Independence and the Role 
of the United Kingdom, in UK Constitutional Law Association – Blog, 11 January 2012, ukconstitutional-
law.org; N. MACCORMICK, Is there a constitutional path to Scottish independence?, in Parliamentary Affairs, 
2000, pp. 725-726. 
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The most recent developments suggest that the latter route might be tried out after 
the UK Government seems intent on not agreeing to another Scottish independence 
referendum for the time being.45 
For a seamless transition to either EU membership or EFTA/EEA membership, the 
timing of the referendum will be crucial. If – as expected – the UK leaves the EU at the 
end of March 2019,46 it will be practically very difficult, if not impossible, for Scotland to 
stay in the EU without first having to leave as part of the UK. 
This is because the Scottish Government does not want the referendum to take place 
before the contours of a final Brexit agreement and of the future EU-UK relationship are 
known. Given the two-year timeline, one cannot expect this to be the case before the au-
tumn of 2018. Add to that a period of negotiations for Scotland to extricate itself from the 
UK, which even optimists estimate to take at least eighteen months,47 Scotland would still 
be part of the UK at the end of March 2019, even if it voted for independence.48 
Even if there were a vote for independence, Scotland would therefore in all likeli-
hood leave the EU together with the rest of the UK. Its relationship with the EU would 
therefore be the same as that of the rUK from April 2019 onwards. It seems now unlike-
ly that the EU-UK the future relationship will have been determined and negotiated at 
that point. It is therefore probable that the immediate post-Brexit period will require a 
transitional relationship between the EU and the UK to be agreed. It seems that both 
the UK and EU side accept this as a matter of principle. 
It is not clear what exact contours this relationship will have, but it is likely that the 
UK will remain in the customs union and in the single market for a limited period of 
time after Brexit. 
There is, of course, the further possibility that the UK will leave the EU without a 
withdrawal agreement and will thus find itself outside the EU without any agreement 
about mutual relations between them. This “no deal” Brexit poses its own very complex 
questions and exploring them would go beyond the remit of this paper. It can be in-
ferred from the following discussion that in case of a “no deal” Brexit, the situation 
would become even more complex for Scotland. 
There are essentially three options for an independent Scotland’s relationship with 
the EU: accession; membership of EFTA/EEA; and a looser relationship with a free trade 
agreement or no such agreement. Given that the main driver behind the Scottish inde-
 
45 Even though the recently called General Election, to be held on 8 June 2017, might change the po-
litical landscape again. 
46 Id est after the expiry of the two-year period for negotiations envisaged by Art. 50 TEU. 
47 This was the estimate of the Scottish Government in the run-up to the 2014 vote, see Scottish 
Government, Scotland’s Future, November 2013, www.gov.scot, pp. 459-460. 
48 For a more detailed exposition of the timing issues see K. HUGHES, T. LOCK, An Independent Scot-
land and the EU: What Route to Membership?, in European Futures, 20 February 2017, 
www.europeanfutures.ed.ac.uk. 
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pendence movement – the Scottish National Party – is in favour of EU membership and 
given that a key pro-independence argument in a second referendum is likely to be that 
an independent Scotland could maintain closer links with the EU than Scotland as part 
of the UK, the third option will not be discussed here. 
iv.2. Accession to the EU 
It should be pointed out at the start that an independent Scotland after Brexit would be 
faced with a different scenario than an independent Scotland would have been in 2014. 
In 2014 Scotland would have seceded from an existing (and for all intents and purposes 
continuing) EU Member State and would have tried to accede to the EU in addition to it. 
According to pro-independence advocates such an “internal enlargement”49 would not 
even have required a transitional period where Scotland would have found itself out-
side the EU for a while, though this had been disputed, most notably by the President of 
the EU Commission at the time.50 
In case of a second independence referendum the situation would be different. As 
pointed out above, Scotland would certainly be out of the EU before becoming independ-
ent and would therefore have to apply to join the EU as a new Member State. The acces-
sion process would therefore happen according to the procedure set out in Art. 49 TEU. 
Having received a Scottish application for EU membership, the European Commis-
sion would assess Scotland’s application, make a non-binding recommendation to the 
Council on whether to proceed – and if a green light is given – start the talks. This would 
then be followed by a phase of negotiations which would result in an accession treaty to 
be agreed upon by the Council with unanimity; by the European Parliament with a ma-
jority of its members; and to be ratified by all Member States (as well as Scotland) ac-
cording to their constitutional requirements.51 
As a matter of principle, Scotland would need to sign up to the EU acquis. At pre-
sent, the law applicable in Scotland is compliant with most aspects of it given that the 
UK is still an EU Member State. There would however be three main challenges. 
The first challenge relates to the period that Scotland is likely to spend outside the 
EU and in how far its laws would be have started to diverge from the EU acquis during 
 
49 This term is used by N. WALKER, Internal Enlargement in the European Union: Beyond Legalism and 
Political Expediency, in SSRN, 21 October 2015, papers.ssrn.com; for an argument for a Union doctrine on 
internal enlargement see C. CLOSA, Secession from a Member State and EU Membership: the View from 
the Union, in European Constitutional Law Review, 2016, p. 240.  
50 Letter by M. Barroso, President of the European Commission, addressed to the House of Lords EU 
Committee, 10 December 2012, www.parliament.uk. 
51 It is often claimed that Spain – which has its own problems with separatism – might veto Scottish 
accession to the EU. However, recent comments by the Spanish foreign minister suggest that Spain would 
not block Scotland’s application to become an EU Member State. See S. MACNAB, Spain ‘would not block’ 
independent Scotland EU application, in The Scotman, 2 April 2017, www.scotsman.com.  
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that period. The length of that period is difficult to predict with precision, but the follow-
ing calculation might give an indication. Assuming that Scotland voted for independence 
in late 2018 and assuming that it would take another eighteen months to two years for 
Scotland to negotiate its way out of the UK, Scotland would formally become independ-
ent in the second half of 2020 at the earliest. It would then be in a position to apply for 
EU membership.52 If one takes the relatively short accession negotiations with the four 
EFTA countries Norway (which then did not join), Austria, Sweden, and Finland as a 
rough blueprint, the timeline would look roughly like this: accession talks took thirteen 
months (to complete “politically”), and it took seventeen months in total (from February 
1993 to June 1994) to negotiate and sign the accession treaties. There was then a fur-
ther six months for ratification, so they joined in January 1995. Hence Scotland might be 
in a position to join the EU in late 2022 or early 2023.53 
This would, however, mean that Scotland would find itself outside the EU for a peri-
od of three to four years. That period itself would be divided into two parts of Scotland 
outside the EU as part of the UK; and Scotland outside the EU as an independent coun-
try. The question in how far Scotland’s laws would begin to deviate from the EU acquis – 
which is under constant development – would therefore depend first on the relation-
ship between the UK and the EU in the transitional period after Brexit; and on the rela-
tionship between an independent Scotland and the EU after independence but before 
EU accession. As for the former, there is a certain likelihood that the UK will remain 
close or indeed part of the single market, so that key EU rules might continue to be ap-
plied and updated. If not, Scotland should try to ensure to keep up with the EU acquis 
as far as its competence allows; and as far as developments of the EU acquis cannot be 
followed because the policy area is reserved, either ask Westminster for an order ex 
section 30 of the Scotland Act 1998 allowing the Scottish Parliament to legislate anyway, 
or failing that, update Scots law immediately upon gaining independence. 
As for the time after independence, Scotland would need to ensure that it continues 
to mirror the EU acquis as far as possible. As far as the single market is concerned, this 
might in practical terms best be achieved if Scotland joined EFTA/EEA even if just tem-
porarily. This would not only ensure compliance with the EU acquis in view of a later ac-
cession, but also enable Scotland to benefit from trading within the single market. 
The second challenge then consists of ensuring that Scotland either adopts those 
parts of the EU acquis that it currently is opted out from by virtue of the UK’s existing 
opt-outs or that it can secure similar opt-outs in the accession negotiations. The idea 
that Scotland would by law be in a position to simply continue benefiting from the UK’s 
 
52 Hence the question whether the Barroso theory that an independent Scotland seceding from the 
UK as an EU Member State would automatically find itself outside the EU is correct, is irrelevant for this 
scenario; on the lack of merits of this theory see D. EDWARD, Scotland’s Position in the European Union, in 
Scottish Parliamentary Review, 2013, p. 1. 
53 See also K. HUGHES, T. LOCK, An Independent Scotland and the EU: What Route to Membership?, cit. 
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current opt-outs, which had been mooted by the Scottish Government in the run-up to 
the 2014 vote, should be dismissed.54 This is because the Scottish Government’s argu-
ment at the time was based on a seamless transition from leaving the UK – an EU 
Member State – to becoming an independent Scotland – also as an EU Member State. 
As argued above, this is not going to be the case. 
The UK’s three major opt-outs concern the Area of Freedom Security and Justice 
(AFSJ),55 the Schengen agreement,56 and Economic and Monetary Union.57 However, the 
EU has opted into certain AFSJ measures and participates in some aspects of the 
Schengen acquis. 
It is difficult to see how Scotland could avoid having to sign up to the Economic and 
Monetary Union or the AFSJ. There is no practical-political argument – other than that it 
might be unpopular – to allow Scotland to stay out of these fields of integration. The 
Schengen acquis might be different, however, given that Scotland would have a political 
interest in continuing to keep an open border with rUK. Even as an independent coun-
try, Scotland might want to stay part of the Common Travel Area, which operates 
throughout the UK, Ireland, the Channel Islands, and the Isle of Man.58 
The third challenge for Scotland would consist in preparing the ground for swift EU 
membership internally. It would need to set up an administrative structure independent 
of that of the UK. Thanks to devolution, this is already partly in place, but Scotland cur-
rently lacks institutions such as a central bank or a competition authority, which would 
need to be in place before joining the EU. In addition, it would need to retain as part of 
Scots law those pieces of UK legislation that can be considered to be part of the EU acquis. 
It made sense that EU membership for an independent Scotland was the stated aim 
of the Scottish Government in 2014 given that it any reason to assume that the rUK 
would continue to be in the EU. The question now is whether the case for EU member-
ship has not been weakened in light of the UK’s future outside the EU. The drawbacks 
for trade in goods of being in the EU customs union when the rUK is not were outlined 
above. Add to that the possible need to sign up to the Schengen acquis,59 which would 
mean the need for passport checks at the border between Scotland and rUK, and one 
can see that Scottish EU membership may not be as attractive politically as it might 
have been in 2014. In addition, Scotland would have to continue being signed up to the 
EU’s Common Fisheries Policy, which is not popular among those involved in Scottish 
fishing. Even though in practice there may not be much of a difference between an in-
 
54 See Scottish Government, Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an Independent Scotland, 2013, 
www.gov.scot, p. 216 et seq.  
55 See Protocol no. 21 of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
56 Protocol no. 20 of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
57 Protocol no. 15 of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
58 The latter are not part of the UK, but are Crown Dependencies. 
59 Though there might be wriggle room for Scotland in this regard. 
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dependent Scottish fishing policy and being subjected to the Common Fisheries Poli-
cy,60 fisheries are an emotive issue in Scottish politics, so that it may become an im-
portant battle ground in an independence referendum. 
iv.3. Accession to EFTA/EEA 
The obvious alternative to EU membership for an independent Scotland would be to 
sign up to EFTA and the EEA. According to Art. 56 of the EFTA Convention, an independ-
ent Scotland could apply to become a member of EFTA. The only condition is approval 
by all four EFTA States. EEA membership is open to EFTA States.61 According to Art. 128, 
para. 2, of the EEA Agreement, the terms and conditions of EEA membership are subject 
to the accession treaty, which all (in the future 30) EEA Member States must ratify. 
The key advantage of EFTA/EEA membership would be that an independent Scot-
land would remain free to negotiate a closer relationship with rUK than is likely to exist 
between the EU and the UK. If the EU-UK relationship primarily consists in a free trade 
agreement abolishing tariffs between them and providing for some form of reduction 
of non-tariff barriers,62 then Scotland could opt for a closer relationship including e.g. 
free movement of people, a common customs area, and even a currency union. 
Of course, there would also be drawbacks. The discussion above on a differentiated 
solution for Scotland featuring EFTA/EEA membership applies here too and serves to 
illustrate this point. 
V. Conclusion 
The EU referendum of 23 June 2016 has left Scottish voters somewhere between a rock 
and a hard place. Having rejected Scottish independence in 2014, they are now facing 
the prospect of being dragged out of the EU and the EU single market against their will. 
Realistically, remaining in either the single market or the EU may only be possible if 
Scotland opts for independence, which they had rejected less than three years ago. 
In-between solutions are conceivable, but very difficult to bring to fruition. The most 
realistic one would be Scottish EFTA/EEA membership, but it would still have drawbacks. 
Not only would it be difficult to negotiate given that the Scottish Government is not di-
rectly involved in the Brexit negotiations. Westminster would therefore need to be con-
vinced to negotiate this solution not only with the rest of the EU, but separately with the 
other EFTA States with whom no negotiations are currently planned. As the UK Gov-
 
60 See T. APPLEBY, J. HARRISON, Brexit and the Future of Scottish Fisheries: Key Legal Issues in a 
Changing Regulatory Landscape, in Journal of Water Law, 2017, p. 124. 
61 See Art. 128 of the EEA Agreement. 
62 E.g. through common regulatory standards and/or mutual recognition where no such common 
standards exist. 
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ernment’s response to the Scottish Government’s paper “Scotland’s Place in Europe” 
shows, this has not happened. 
In addition, this would need to occur under serious time-pressure. Moreover, it 
would also require significantly more devolution to Scotland, which would in practice 
result in Scotland having almost full autonomy from rUK. Again, this is legally possible, 
but politically difficult. 
It is unlikely therefore that the “Scottish question” will go away any time soon. 
